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Abstract 
Since firms in an emissions trading program are linked together through a permit market, so too 
are their compliance choices. Thus, enforcement strategies for trading programs must account for 
not only the direct effects of enforcement on compliance and emissions decisions, but also the 
indirect effects that occur because changes in enforcement can induce changes in permit prices. 
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test for these direct and indirect market effects. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a direct effect of enforcement on individual 
violations, as well as a countervailing market effect through the permit price. Thus, the 
productivity of increased enforcement pressure to reduce noncompliance is partially offset by a 
countervailing price effect. Furthermore, there is no direct effect of enforcement on the 
emissions choices of firms, only a negative price effect.  This suggests that the only way 
increased enforcement can have an impact on environmental quality is if it is large enough and 
applied widely enough to induce an increase in the equilibrium permit price.  
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Direct and Market Effects of Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: 
An Experimental Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
By exploiting the power of a market to allocate pollution control responsibilities, well-designed 
emissions trading programs promise to achieve environmental quality goals more cheaply than 
traditional command-and-control regulations. It is clear, however, that the potential of emissions 
trading is jeopardized if these programs are not enforced well. In recognition of this fact, there is 
now a significant literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading programs [e.g., 
Keeler (1991), Malik (1990, 1992, 2002), vanEgteren and Weber (1996), Stranlund and Dhanda 
(1999), Stranlund and Chavez (2000)]. In general this literature suggests that compliance 
behavior in emissions trading programs is likely to be very different from behavior under 
command-and-control standards or fixed emissions taxes. One of the more important differences 
is that firms in an emissions trading program are linked together through the functioning of the 
permit market, while they operate largely independently under both command-and-control 
policies and emissions taxes. Thus, compliance and enforcement of emissions trading programs 
are inextricably linked to permit markets.  Indeed, any factor that affects compliance decisions 
will in turn impact the permit market, which has its own indirect effect on compliance via the 
permit price. This suggests that any enforcement strategy or analysis of compliance decisions in 
emissions trading must account for the direct effects of factors that affect compliance, as well as 
their indirect market, or price, effects.  
For this study we have designed and conducted laboratory experiments to examine the direct 
and indirect market effects of enforcement on pollution and compliance decisions. Our primary 
motivation in this work is the simple notion that having a theoretically sound and empirically 
validated understanding of compliance behavior in emissions trading programs is necessary for 
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the proper design and evaluation of enforcement strategies for these programs. Although 
experimental techniques have been used to evaluate many other policy initiatives, including 
some aspects of emissions trading programs [e.g., Cason (1995), Cason and Plott (1996), 
Ishikida et al. (1998), Isaac and Holt (1999)], these techniques have not yet been widely applied 
to issues of regulatory enforcement or compliance behavior in emissions trading programs.1 The 
only other research that addresses compliance behavior in emissions trading programs is the 
recent work by Cason and Gangadharan (2004).  
In this study we focus on imperfect compliance in emissions trading programs; hence, this 
study is not an analysis of some well-known programs that have been very successful in 
maintaining nearly perfect compliance.  One of these, of course, is the SO2 Allowance Trading 
program. It is widely understood that the major contributors to the compliance success of this 
and other similar programs are the continuous emissions monitoring systems and sophisticated 
data transmission technologies that are required of all sources. Implementing emissions trading 
policies beyond their current applications implies moving them into contexts in which inducing 
and maintaining perfect compliance will be more difficult. These more difficult environments 
motivate our focus on imperfect compliance behavior.   
Several of the hypotheses we derive from a straightforward model of compliance in 
emissions trading programs are supported by the experimental data.  One of the most important 
of these is that there is a direct effect of enforcement on individual violations, as well as a 
countervailing market effect through the permit price. Increased enforcement—through increased 
monitoring or higher penalties—motivates firms to reduce their violations by purchasing more 
permits. This puts upward pressure on the equilibrium permit price, but higher permit prices 
                                                 
1  James Alm has successfully applied experimental techniques to the analysis of tax compliance. See, for example, 
Alm et al. (1992a, 1992b) and  Alm (1998). 
 
 
 3
motivate firms toward greater violations. Our experimental data are consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that the direct effect is always larger so that increased enforcement results 
in lower violations. However, the basic conclusion in this regard should be clear—the 
productivity of enforcement pressure in reducing noncompliance in emissions trading programs 
is partially offset by a countervailing price effect. Regulators that ignore this price effect would 
over-estimate the effectiveness of any attempt to reduce violations in an emissions trading 
program.   
Another policy implication of this indirect price effect is that directing more enforcement 
pressure at a group of firms, presumably to motivate them toward greater compliance, is likely to 
involve a cost that regulators may not have recognized. The firms that are targeted with more 
enforcement pressure will purchase more permits to reduce their violations, thereby putting 
upward pressure on the equilibrium permit price. A higher permit price, however, motivates all 
the other firms in the program toward larger violations. Therefore, targeting groups of firms to 
increase their compliance may be accompanied by reduced compliance by other firms. This 
cannot happen under command-and-control regulation or a fixed emissions tax because firms 
under these regulations are not linked together through a permit market.  
The experimental results are also consistent with a somewhat surprising result about 
enforcement and emissions choices—there is no direct effect of enforcement on the emissions 
choices of firms; there is only a negative price effect.2  That is, a firm’s choice of emissions is 
independent of the enforcement strategy it faces, but this choice is not independent of the price 
of permits. Enhanced enforcement pressure can only induce a change in firms’ emissions if it 
                                                 
2  Malik (1990) appears to be the first to have derived these conclusions in the case of emissions trading. Harford 
(1978) noted the result that the choice of emissions may be independent of enforcement in the case of an 
emissions tax.  This result holds only if the monitoring probability that a firm faces is independent of its actual 
choice of emissions.  
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causes an increase in the equilibrium permit price. Our experimental data provide strong support 
for this conclusion. One implication of this conclusion is that increased enforcement pressure 
applied to a single firm, or a small subset of firms, will have no environmental impact. The only 
way that increased enforcement can have an impact on environmental quality is if it is large 
enough and applied widely enough to lead to an increase in the equilibrium permit price.  
Matters are quite different for emissions standards and taxes. Under fixed emissions 
standards, adjusting emissions levels is the only way a firm can change its level of 
noncompliance. Thus, increased enforcement of emissions standards will reduce emissions and 
improve environmental quality. In the case of a fixed emissions tax, however, increased 
enforcement will have absolutely no affect on emissions. In this case, as in the case of 
competitive emissions trading, firms’ emissions choices are independent of changes in 
enforcement strategies. In contrast to emissions trading, however, the “price” of emissions is 
fixed so the indirect effect on emissions from enforcement cannot occur.  
Although this work was motivated primarily by our desire to trace out the direct and market 
effects of enforcement, we did discover another effect that contradicts a standard theory of 
compliance behavior. Compliance choices by risk-neutral competitive firms in emissions trading 
programs should be independent of the initial allocation of permits. This is consistent with the 
well-known result that the emissions choices of perfectly competitive firms in emissions trading 
program are independent of initial allocations (Montgomery 1972).3 Our results contradict both 
of these conclusions.  What appears to matter most here is how the initial allocation of permits 
determines who will be net sellers of permits and who will be net buyers. Our analysis suggests 
                                                 
3  It is well known that Montgomery’s independence result does not hold in the presence of market power 
[Hahn(1984)] or transaction costs [Stavins (1995)].  Similarly, compliance choices will not be independent of the 
initial allocation of permits in the presence of market power [van Egteren and Weber (1996), Malik (2002), 
Chavez and Stranlund (2003)], or transaction costs [Chavez and Stranlund (2004)].   
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that net sellers tend to retain more permits, and have lower violations and higher emissions than 
the competitive equilibrium prediction, while net buyers hold fewer permits and tend toward 
higher violations and lower emissions. Since fewer permits change hands, permit prices tend to 
be higher than competitive equilibrium predictions.  
The results of this paper make it clear that the compliance behavior of firms are linked 
together in emissions trading programs through the normal workings of permit markets. We 
provide a model of these linkages in the next section.  In section 3 we provide details of the 
experiments we designed to test for these linkages. The results of the experiments are presented 
and discussed in section 4. We conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this paper are drawn from a model of compliance by a fixed number of risk 
neutral firms in a perfectly competitive emissions trading program. The abatement costs of firm i 
are summarized by c(qi, αi), which is strictly decreasing and convex in the firm’s emissions qi. 
Heterogeneity of the firms is captured by the parameter αi, and we assume that total and 
marginal abatement costs are increasing in this parameter.  A total of Q emissions permits are 
distributed to the firms, free of charge. Firm i receives 0
il  permits initially, and holds li permits 
after trading in a compliance period is complete.  Assume competitive behavior in the permit 
market so that trade establishes a constant price per permit p.   
If firm i is noncompliant, its emissions exceed the number of permits it holds and the 
magnitude of its violation is vi = qi – li > 0. If a firm is compliant, qi – li ≤ 0 and vi = 0. We do not 
allow firms to bank permits, so a firm’s permit holdings will never exceed its emissions.  To 
check for compliance, each firm is audited with probability π. A firm that is found to be in 
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violation is assessed a penalty, f(vi, φ). The penalty for a zero violation is zero but the marginal 
penalty for a zero violation is strictly positive [f(0, φ) = 0 and fv(0, φ) > 0].  Furthermore, for a 
positive violation the penalty is increasing and strictly convex in the level of the violation [fv(vi, 
φ) > 0 and fvv(vi, φ) > 0].  An increase in the parameter φ increases both total and marginal 
penalties; that is, fφ(vi, φ) > 0 and fvφ(vi, φ) > 0.  
Assuming that each firm chooses positive emissions and permits and never over-complies, 
then i’s problem is to choose emissions and permits to minimize c(qi, αi) + p(li – 0il ) + π f(qi – li, 
φ), subject to qi – li ≥ 0. Let ‹ denote the Lagrange equation for this problem and let λ be the 
multiplier attached to the constraint. The following first-order conditions are both necessary and 
sufficient to determine optimal choices of emissions and permit demand:  
 
  ‹q = cq(qi, αi) + πfv(qi – li, φ) – λ = 0;   [1] 
  ‹l = p – πfv(qi – li, φ) + λ = 0;     [2] 
  ‹λ = qi – li ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λ(qi – li) = 0.    [3] 
 
These conditions implicitly define a firm’s optimal choices of emissions, permit demand, and 
violation as 
 
  ei = ei(π, φ, p, αi);   
  li = li(π, φ, p, αi);   
   vi = ei – li = vi(π, φ, p, αi).      [4]  
 
Note that these choices do not depend at all on a firm’s initial allocation of permits, simply 
because this allocation does not enter any of the first-order conditions.  
 As we noted in the introduction, our focus is on enforcement and compliance in situations 
involving imperfect compliance. Assuming positive noncompliance (vi > 0), the comparative 
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statics of the firm’s choices are contained in Table 1. Complete derivations of these results are 
available from the authors.  
Holding the permit price constant, note how a firm responds to enhanced enforcement 
(either through increased monitoring or increased penalties). Combine [1] and [2] to obtain         
–cq(qi, αi) = p. This indicates the standard result that, under a competitive emissions trading 
program, firms will choose emissions so that their marginal abatement costs are equal to the 
prevailing permit price. Note, however, that this decision is independent of the enforcement 
variables. Thus, holding the permit price constant, increased enforcement does not lead to a 
change in firms’ emissions [  0i iq qπ φ= = ].  Instead, they purchase more permits to reduce the 
extent of their violations [ 0, 0i iv vπ φ< < ]. As we will show in a short while, this will put upward 
pressure on the equilibrium permit price, which then has an indirect effect on the firms’ choices. 
Note that a firm’s emissions are decreasing in the permit price [ 0ipq < ], while its violations are 
increasing [ 0ipv > ].  The intuition behind the latter result is that a higher permit price indicates a 
higher compliance price.4  
Now let us turn to characterizing the equilibrium of an emissions permit market with 
noncompliant firms. Define the vectors α = (αi)i ∈ N, where N is the set of regulated firms. Given 
that a total of Q permits are issued to the firms, and the enforcement authority has committed 
itself to monitoring each firm with probability π and imposing penalties with parameter φ, the 
equilibrium permit price is p  = p (π, φ, Q, α). Using [4], the equilibrium permit price must 
equate aggregate demand for permits to aggregate supply; that is, p  must satisfy 
                                                 
4  Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) argue that difference in firms’ choices of violation in a competitive emissions 
trading program are independent of differences in their marginal abatement costs [ 0ivα =  in Table 1].  
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( , , , ) .i il p Qπ φ α =∑       [5] 
 
(Summations throughout are taken over the entire set of regulated firms).  
In this study we are mainly interested in firm’s choices of emissions and their violations. (Of 
course, a firm’s permit holdings can be inferred directly from knowledge of its emissions and 
violation). Combine [4] and [5] to specify equilibrium emissions and violations:   
 ( )( , , , ) , , ( , , , ), ;i i iq Q q p Qπ φ π φ π φ α=α α  
( )( , , , ) , , ( , , , ), .i i iv Q v p Qπ φ π φ π φ α=α α    [6] 
To determine the direct and indirect price effects of enforcement on these equilibrium choices, 
obtain the following from [5]: 
 
  pπ  = 0
i i
pl lπ− >∑ ∑  and pφ  = 0.i ipl lφ− >∑ ∑   [7] 
 
The signs of pπ  and pφ   follow from 
ilπ  > 0 and 
i
pl  < 0 (see Table 1). Intuitively, increased 
monitoring or penalties motivates noncompliant firms to purchase more permits, which puts 
upward pressure on the equilibrium permit price. We, therefore, have our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Increased monitoring or penalties increases the price of emissions permits.  
 
That increased enforcement puts upward pressure on permit prices has important 
implications for the effects of enforcement on individual choices of emissions and violations. 
From [6] obtain 0.i i i ip pq q q p q pπ π π π= + = <  Notice the potential for a direct effect of monitoring 
on emissions and an indirect effect through the permit price. However, the direct effect is zero 
 
 
 9
because emissions choices are independent of enforcement strategies ( iqπ  = 0 from Table 1). 
Since increased monitoring puts upward pressure on the equilibrium permit price, firms respond 
to this by decreasing their emissions. The same conclusion follows if there is a change in the 
penalty for noncompliance.  
Since aggregate emissions must fall with increased monitoring or penalties, given a fixed 
permit supply, aggregate violations must also fall. This would not be completely obvious by 
considering how individual equilibrium violations change with monitoring or penalties. From [6] 
obtain 0.i i ipv v v pπ π π= + <  The direct effect of monitoring is to reduce the violation of an 
individual firm ( 0ivπ < ). However, increased monitoring increases the equilibrium permit price, 
which motivates the firm to increase its violation ( 0ipv pπ > ).  Since aggregate violations must 
fall with increased monitoring, each individual’s violation must also fall. Thus, the direct effect 
of monitoring outweighs the indirect price effect. Increasing the penalty has the same qualitative 
effects as an increase in monitoring.   
Our results about the equilibrium affects of enforcement on emissions and violation choices 
are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The equilibrium effect of monitoring and penalties on individual violations is 
composed of a negative direct effect and a positive indirect market effect via the permit price. 
The direct effect is stronger than the price effect, so the total effect of increased monitoring or 
penalties is to reduce equilibrium violations.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The direct effect of monitoring and penalties on emissions choices is zero. 
However, an increase in either monitoring or penalties will induce an increase in the 
equilibrium permit price, to which firms respond by reducing their emissions. 
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We should also formalize the most obvious hypothesis of this model: the initial distribution 
of permits should have no impact on equilibrium outcomes.  
 
Hypothesis 4: A redistribution of the initial allocation of permits has no effect on firms’ choices 
of emissions and violations.  Consequently, the equilibrium permit price is also independent of a 
redistribution of the initial allocation of permits.   
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 Experiment design 
The experiments were designed to test for direct and indirect market effects on individual 
emissions and violations, but the subjects were placed in a more neutral environment. Consistent 
with other emissions trading studies (e.g., Franciosi et al. 1999), we framed the experiments as a 
production decision in which permits conveyed a license to produce, rather than an emissions 
decision, to avoid introducing potential biases due to individual attitudes about pollution or 
emissions trading.  During each period of the experiment, subjects simultaneously chose to 
produce units of a fictitious good and traded in a market for permits that conveyed the right to 
produce the good.5  Participants could produce as many units of the good as they wished (up to a 
capacity constraint) regardless of the number of permits that they owned.  However, at the end of 
the period, each individual was audited with a known probability.  If an individual was audited 
and found to be non-compliant (i.e., total production exceeded permit holdings), then a penalty 
was applied.  The treatment variables in this paper are the probability of audit, the marginal 
penalty function, the initial permit allocation, and the total supply of permits.  Table 2 
summarizes the experimental design. Each cell was repeated three times.  The columns represent 
                                                 
5  Throughout the paper, we assume a constant relationship between production and emissions, and use these two 
terms interchangeably.  Note that our results are applicable to any market-based program in which tradable 
permits convey the right to engage in an economic activity. 
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the different aggregate standards and initial permit allocations, while the three rows reflect the 
different enforcement strategies (marginal expect penalties or MEP).  
Subjects received a benefit from their choice of production, q, according to an “Earnings 
from Production” schedule. The Earnings from Production schedule is a discrete approximation 
to a linear marginal benefit function ( )b q qα β′ = − , where and α β  are positive constants. If q 
is interpreted as emissions, then ( )b q′ is a standard marginal abatement cost function. Each 
experiment had eight subjects divided evenly into two firm types.  Type-A firms had higher 
production benefits (higher marginal abatement costs) with parameters 17 and 1.A Aα β= =  
These firms could produce up to 17 units.  The Type-B firms had a lower production benefits 
(lower marginal abatement costs) with parameters 16 and 2,B Bα β= =  and they could produce 
up to 8 units.6  
To be compliant, subjects were required to possess sufficient permits, l, to cover their 
production choices. Limiting the total number of permits imposed a cap on aggregate production.  
We chose two aggregate standards, one high ( 56HQ = ) and the other low ( 28LQ = ).  In the low 
aggregate standard experiments, each of the four Type-A firms was allocated three permits, and 
the four Type-B firms were each given four permits.  We call this the (nearly) uniform initial 
allocation.  In the high aggregate standard experiments, there were two different initial 
allocations of permits.  With a uniform initial allocation, each of the eight subjects in an 
experiment started with seven permits.  With a non-uniform initial allocation, the Type-A firms 
began with 13 permits, and the Type-B firms had a single permit.  In the competitive 
                                                 
6  This means that for the Type-A firms, the marginal benefit of the first unit was E$17 and decreased by E$1 per 
unit for 17 units (i.e., 17, 16, …, 1). For the Type-B firms, the marginal benefit of the first unit was E$16 and 
decreased by E$2 per unit for 8 units (i.e., 16, 14, …, 2). 
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equilibrium, the Type-B firms would be the net sellers of permits with the uniform initial 
allocation, and net buyers of permits when the initial allocation is non-uniform. 
To check for compliance, each subject’s record was examined with a known probability π . 
If a subject was audited and found to be non-compliant, that is q > l, she was penalized according 
to a penalty schedule generated from the quadratic function, 2( ) ( / 2)( ) ,f F q l q lφ= − + −  where 
F and φ  are positive constants. Note that the penalty function is strictly convex, so that each 
additional unit of violation brings a higher penalty.  By changing the parameters of the marginal 
expected penalty function, [ ( )]f F q lπ π φ′ = + − , we developed three enforcement strategies 
which we labeled Med(πH), Med(πL), and Low (the tag Med should be read “medium”). The 
treatments Med(πH) and Med(πL) involve the same marginal expected penalties, but Med(πH) has 
a higher monitoring probability ( 0.70Hπ = ) and a relatively low marginal penalty function, 
whereas Med(πL) has a lower monitoring probability ( 0.35Lπ = ) and a higher marginal penalty 
function. 7 Our intention here was to examine whether the subjects reacted differently to 
monitoring and penalties.  Subjects were expected to choose to be noncompliant in these medium 
MEP treatments. The Low marginal expected penalty function was constructed to be a weaker 
enforcement strategy, with the low monitoring probability, πL, and a low marginal penalty 
function.  Enforcement parameter values were chosen, in part, so that the expected marginal 
penalty functions are parallel to each other—each has a slope of about one.   
                                                 
7  The subjects were given penalty schedules that were discrete approximations to the marginal penalty function 
( )f F q lφ′ = + − .  The parameters of the penalty schedule (F, φ) for each marginal expected penalty treatment 
are (F=6, φ=1.43) for Med(πH), (12, 2.90) for Med(πL), and (2, 2.90) for Low.   The schedule was the same for 
each firm type with the exception that, since Type-B firms could only produce a maximum of eight units, only the 
first eight steps were displayed for these firms.   
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3.2 Experiment procedures 
Participants were recruited from the student population at the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst.  Subjects were paid $7 for agreeing to participate and showing up on time, and were 
then given an opportunity to earn additional money in the experiment.  These additional earnings 
ranged between $7 and $18, with a mean of $14.33 (σ=1.32).  Earnings were paid in cash at the 
end of each experiment.  Each experiment lasted about 2 hours. 
The experiments were run in a computer lab using software designed in Visual Basic 
specifically for this research.  To familiarize subjects with the experiments, we ran a series of 
training experiments.  In the first stage of the trainers, students read online instructions that 
included interactive questions to ensure that they understood the instructions before proceeding.  
After everyone had completed the instructions and all questions were answered, the training 
experiment began.  These practice rounds contained all the same features as the “real data” 
experiments with the exception that we used a different set of parameters.  The data from the 
trainers were discarded. 
For the real data sessions, we recruited participants from the pool of trained subjects.  
Subjects were allowed to participate in multiple sessions.  A total of 153 subjects participated in 
27 eight-person experiments.  Prior to the start of the real data experiments, subjects were given 
a summary of the experiment instructions (see Appendix).  The experimenter read these 
instructions aloud and answered any questions.  Each subject was given a calculator, a pencil and 
paper. Each experiment consisted of 12 identical five-minute rounds.  At the start of each period, 
the eight subjects were each given an initial allocation of permits and E$10 in cash.8   
                                                 
8  This extra cash was provided to guard against bankruptcy.  During the experiment, subjects earned experimental 
dollars (E$) that were converted to US dollars at a pre-announced exchange rate.   
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A unique feature of our experiments is that the production decisions and permit market 
trading were unbundled into two separate, but simultaneous, activities.  We did this to allow for 
the possibility that the production level and permit holdings could differ, thereby introducing a 
compliance decision.  Previous permit market experiments assumed perfect compliance (i.e., 
production exactly equals the number of permits owned at the end of the trading period) and 
subjects earned income based on their final permit holdings plus any net income from permit 
market trading [e.g., Cason et al. (1999), Franciosi et al. (1999)].  
Each unit of the good was produced sequentially by clicking on a button that initiated the 
production process.  Production of a single unit took 10 seconds.  After production of the unit 
was completed the “Earnings from Production” were immediately added to the individual’s cash 
balance.  During the period and concurrent with the production decision, subjects also had the 
ability to alter their permit holdings by trading in a continuous double auction.  In the auction, 
individuals could submit bids to buy or asks to sell a single permit. The highest bid and lowest 
ask price were displayed on the screen.  A trade occurred whenever a buyer accepted the current 
ask or a seller accepted the current bid.  After each trade, the current bid and ask were cleared 
and the market opened for a new set of bids and asks.  The trading price history was displayed on 
the screen. 
Each period lasted a total of five minutes.  The permit market was open for the entire period, 
but production had to be completed in four minutes.  The four-minute production time was more 
than sufficient for a subject to produce up to his or her capacity constraint.  We provided the 
additional minute of permit trading after production was completed to give subjects a final 
opportunity to adjust their permit holdings.  The computer screen displayed the time remaining 
for both production and the permit market. As soon as a period ended, random audits were 
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conducted and penalties were assessed. All information relating to audit outcomes were private 
and not shared with the others in the experiment.   
 
4. Results 
We will begin our analysis of the results of our experiments with a discussion of general patterns 
in the permit price, and individual violations and emissions decisions.9  We use some of these 
patterns to motivate our econometric model specifications when estimating these variables.  In 
order to test our hypotheses about the linkages among firms in a permit market via the permit 
price, we first estimate the permit price and test whether the data support our comparative static 
predictions.  Because our theoretical development and hypotheses suggest that an individual 
firm’s emission and violation decisions are conditioned on the permit price, we then use the 
estimated permit price as an instrumental variable when estimating these choices. Because these 
are multi-round experiments, we control for repeated measures using linear mixed effects 
models.  We omit the data from the first period to minimize the effects of learning; this omission 
does not have a qualitative effect on any of our conclusions.  
 
4.1 General patterns 
Table 3 presents some summary statistics of permit prices.  Note that the average price in each 
treatment tends to be higher than the competitive equilibrium prediction. Only in treatment F is 
the average price statistically indistinguishable from the competitive equilibrium price. Although 
the average price levels are a bit high, they move as expected: they are higher when the supply of 
permits is reduced, and when the marginal expected penalty is increased from low to medium. 
                                                 
9  We remind the reader that the experiments were framed as a production, rather than an emissions, decision to 
avoid introducing any biases.  In this section, we will refer to an emissions decision since that was the initial 
motivation for the research. 
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This latter result is consistent with Hypothesis 1, and suggests that enforcement could have an 
indirect price effect on individual behavior.  Note however that with the high standard, average 
prices are higher when the initial allocation of permits is not uniform.  Thus, our theoretical 
expectation that the initial allocation of permits should have no impact on individual choices and 
market outcomes (Hypothesis 4) appears to be in doubt.   
Tables 4 and 5 present some summary statistics for individual violations and emissions. 
Rather than discuss all the relationships that are apparent in these data, we would like to leave 
that for the econometric analyses.  However, an interesting pattern emerges from these summary 
statistics that plays an important role in how we analyze and interpret individual choices of 
emissions and compliance. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) showed that holding monitoring, 
enforcement and the permit price constant, a change in any parameter that affects the abatement 
costs of a firm has no effect on its choice of violation; thus, ivα  = 0 as noted in Table 1. In the 
competitive equilibrium, this implies that violations should be identical across firm type.  
However, Table 4 shows that for each treatment the mean violations of the firm types are clearly 
different, but whether Type-A firms tend toward higher or lower violations than Type-B firms 
depends on the initial allocation of permits. In particular, consider first the uniform allocation 
treatments (A, B, C, D, E, and F in Table 3). The Type-A firms are predicted to be the net buyers 
of permits in these treatments. Clearly they tend toward higher violations than the Type-B firms 
in these treatments.  For the non-uniform allocation treatments (G, H, and I), the Type-B firms 
are predicted to be the permit buyers, and they are the ones that tend toward higher violations.  It 
appears, therefore, that the differences in violations by firm type do not have as much to do with 
difference in their marginal abatements costs, but rather whether the initial allocation of permits 
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makes them net buyers or sellers of permits. Of course, this speculation is easily tested and we 
will do so shortly. 
As with violations, mean emissions also show a consistent pattern. In Table 5, note that with 
a uniform allocation, when the Type-A firms are predicted to be net buyers of permits, their 
emissions are significantly lower than the competitive equilibrium prediction.  On the other 
hand, for the three non-uniform allocation treatments in which Type-A firms are predicted to be 
net sellers of permits, their emissions are slightly higher than predicted, although in all three 
cases this difference is not statistically significant.  The opposite is true for Type-B firms. In the 
treatments involving a uniform allocation of permits, the Type-B firms are predicted to be net 
sellers of permits, and their average emissions are consistently greater than the competitive 
equilibrium. This does not hold when they are predicted to be net buyers of permits in the non-
uniform allocation treatments.  Their average emissions in treatments G and I are less than the 
competitive equilibrium prediction; in treatment H there is no statistical difference between their 
average emissions and the equilibrium prediction.  
Thus, it appears that net sellers of permits tend toward higher emissions and lower 
violations. This implies that net sellers of permits are also inclined to retain more permits than 
predicted. Consequently, fewer permits change hands than predicted, which is consistent with 
our observation that average permit prices are higher than the competitive equilibrium 
predictions.  
 
4.2  Regression results and tests of hypotheses 
Table 6 presents the results of a linear mixed effects model of the permit price that controls for 
the repeated measures.  The dependent variable is the price of each trade in period t = 2,…,12 of 
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group j = 1,…,27.  The marginal expected penalty (low vs. medium MEP), the aggregate 
standard (low vs. high standard), and the initial allocation (uniform vs. non-uniform) are 
modeled as fixed effects.  Note that we have combined the two medium marginal expected 
penalties. Assuming risk-neutral subjects, since both Med(πH) and Med(πL) have the same 
marginal expected penalties, in theory both should lead to identical market outcomes. We tested 
a model of price with separate dummy variables for the two medium MEP treatments. An F-test 
of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the dummy variables for the Med(πH) and Med(πL) 
treatments are equal cannot be rejected at any conventional level of significance (F=1.55, 
p=0.21). We conducted the same exercise for individual emissions and violation decisions and 
found the same result. Thus, decreasing monitoring and increasing penalties, but leaving the 
marginal expected penalty function unchanged had no affect on individual decisions and market 
outcomes.  
The regression results in Table 6 confirm the impressions we reached by simply comparing 
average prices across treatment. The coefficient on MediumMEP indicates that, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, increased enforcement due to either a higher penalty or a higher monitoring 
probability will put upward pressure on the equilibrium price.  In a moment we will show that 
this shift in price will have an indirect effect on individual emissions and violations.  The 
NonUniform coefficient is positive and weakly significant, which contradicts Hypothesis 4 as we 
expected from our perusal of the average price results. Lastly, the coefficient on HighStandard is 
strongly negative and significant, indicating the unsurprising result that permit prices fall with a 
greater supply of permits.   
Table 7 presents the results of a linear mixed effects model for individual violations. Using 
an instrumental variable approach, PriceHat is the estimated price from the model in Table 6. 
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Since the impact of the non-uniform allocation clearly differs by firm type, depending upon 
whether the firm is predicted to be a net seller or buyer of permits, we capture this effect with the 
variable NetSeller, which is a fixed effect that equals one if the firm is predicted to be a net seller 
(Type-A firms for the non-uniform allocations and Type-B firms for the uniform allocations); 
FirmTypeA is a fixed effect that equals one for Type-A firms.  
From Table 7, note the positive and significant impact of price, and the negative and 
significant impact of enforcement. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, increased enforcement has a 
negative effect on individual violations as well as a countervailing positive impact through the 
permit price.  From the price equation in Table 6, an increase in enforcement induces a $2.56 
increase in price.  Combining this with the PriceHat coefficient of 0.12 in Table 7 yields a 
positive price effect of enforcement on individual violations of +0.31. The coefficient on 
MediumMEP in Table 7 indicates a negative direct effect on violations of –1.69. The total effect 
of increasing enforcement is, therefore, –1.38. As predicted, the productivity of enforcement in 
reducing violations is partially offset by the resulting increase in permit prices. In this case, the 
price effect reduces the direct effect of enforcement by 18%. 
Our estimate of the equilibrium effect of increased enforcement on individual violations is 
only a bit smaller than the competitive equilibrium effect, but the component effects are not very 
close. In the competitive equilibrium, the direct effect of enforcement on violations is –3.60 and 
the price effect is +2.10. Compare these to our estimated effects of –1.70 and +0.31, respectively. 
The total effect is –1.50, which is only slightly higher than the –1.39 estimated effect.   Although 
our estimates of the individual effects deviate substantially from the competitive equilibrium 
effects, the estimated total effect is reasonably accurate.  More interesting is the difference in the 
strength of the indirect price effect. The competitive equilibrium prediction is that the indirect 
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price effect of enforcement reduces the direct effect by about 58%, while our estimate of this 
value is only 18%.   
Recall that in comparing average violations across treatments that we suggested that 
differences in violations by firm type may have had more to do with whether they were net 
buyers or sellers of permits than with difference in their marginal abatements costs.  This is 
confirmed by the regressions results.  Note that the coefficient on FirmTypeA is small and 
insignificant, whereas the NetSeller coefficient is negative and significant. Thus, the only 
distinction in firms that drives difference in their individual violations appears to be whether they 
are net sellers of permits or net buyers, not differences in marginal abatement costs.  Indeed, as 
we suspected, those that are predicted to be net sellers have significantly lower violation levels 
than those that are predicted to be net buyers. 
We designed our experiments to focus on imperfect compliance so that the competitive 
equilibrium for each of the treatments involves positive violations by all firms. In our data, 
however, subjects were compliant in 27% of the observations.  Because of this, we estimated the 
binary noncompliance decision with a random effects logit model (1 = noncompliant).  The 
results in Table 8 are consistent with those in Table 7.  The PriceHat, NetSeller and 
MediumMEP coefficients have the same signs and remain highly significant, while the 
FirmTypeA coefficient becomes weakly significant (p = 0.075).  Note the negative direct effect 
of increased enforcement and the positive price effect on an individual’s choice of whether to be 
noncompliant. As with the decision about the level of violation, we are led to decompose the 
total effect of enforcement on the noncompliance decision into direct and indirect price effects.  
We decomposed the noncompliance decision by first calculating the probability of 
noncompliance given a change in MEP from low to medium, but holding price constant at the 
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low MEP price.  This yields the direct effect of a change in enforcement.  Subtracting this effect 
from the total change in the estimated probability of noncompliance yields the indirect price 
effect.  For example, consider the probability of noncompliance when MEP increases from low 
to medium for a Type-A firm with a uniform permit allocation and a high standard (from 
treatment F to D + E).  The estimated probability of noncompliance is 0.99 with the low MEP, 
which decreases (as one would expect) to 0.69 when the MEP is increased to medium. Thus, the 
total effect of increasing enforcement is to reduce the probability of noncompliance by 0.30.  
However, holding the permit price constant at the estimated low MEP price ($4.22), we see that 
the direct effect of increased enforcement reduces the probability to 0.48. Therefore, the –0.30 
total effect of increased enforcement is decomposed into a direct effect of –0.51 (= 0.48–0.99) 
and a countervailing price effect of +0.21 (= 0.69–0.48).  The price effect of enforcement offsets 
the direct effect by 42%.   
There are six combinations of firm type, aggregate standard and initial allocation for which 
we can calculate these effects.  The ratios of the price effects to the direct effects range from –30 
to –54% (mean –43%).  As with our analysis of the direct and indirect effects of enforcement on 
the levels of individual violations, the enforcement-induced price effect significantly dampens 
the productivity of increased enforcement on compliance decisions.  
Let us now turn to the analysis of individual emissions decisions. Recall that our third 
hypothesis about the direct and indirect effects of enforcement is that a change in enforcement 
has no direct effect on emissions, only a negative price effect.  Table 9 presents the results of 
linear mixed effects models for individual emissions.  Consistent with Hypotheses 3, the permit 
price has a negative and significant effect on emissions, while the effect of the marginal expected 
penalty is small and insignificant.  Thus, as predicted, the only impact of increased enforcement 
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on emissions is through its effect on permit prices. Recall from the price results in Table 6 that 
increasing the marginal expected penalty from low to medium leads to an increase in the permit 
price of $2.56. Multiplying this by the coefficient on PriceHat in the emissions equation yields   
–1.29 as the total effect of increasing enforcement on individual emissions. This is only a bit 
smaller than the predicted effect of –1.575. 
As with individual violations, the significant positive coefficient on the NetSeller variable is 
consistent with our suspicion that those who are predicted to be net sellers of permits tend to 
emit more than those who are predicted to be net buyers of permits.  Lastly, note that the strongly 
positive coefficient on FirmTypeA is consistent with the prediction that those with higher 
abatement costs will tend to emit more (recall iqα  > 0 from Table 1). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Enforcement of emissions trading programs is different from enforcing emissions taxes and 
standards in a very fundamental way. Since firms in an emissions trading program are linked 
together through the permit market, so too are their compliance choices. This implies that 
enforcement strategies for trading programs must account for the direct effects of enforcement 
on compliance and emissions decisions, as well as indirect effects that occur because changes in 
enforcement can induce changes in permit prices. Obviously, these indirect market effects are 
not present when firms face fixed emissions standards or taxes.  
 The results of our laboratory experiments generally support the conclusions of a 
theoretical model of compliance behavior in emissions trading programs. The productivity of 
increased enforcement pressure to reduce noncompliance is partially offset by a countervailing 
price effect. Our estimate of the size of this offset is smaller than predicted, but nevertheless its 
magnitude is such that it cannot be ignored. Moreover, our analysis of the binary choice of 
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whether to be compliant indicates that the price effect has a large impact on a firm’s compliance 
decision. Regulators who ignore this indirect price effect could significantly over-estimate the 
effectiveness of any attempt to reduce violations in an emissions trading program.   
Furthermore, there is no direct effect of enforcement on individual emissions choices, 
only a price effect.  One might reasonably expect that increased enforcement would lead to lower 
emissions, which we find to be true, but this occurs only if increased enforcement induces higher 
permit prices. Unless an increase in enforcement pressure is sufficient to affect the market price, 
it will have no impact on individual emission choices.  Regulators should be aware that modest 
increases in enforcement pressure might have little or no impact on emissions levels and 
environmental quality.  
All of our hypotheses have been confirmed by our experimental results, except one. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions, the initial allocation of permits has a significant impact on 
individual choices of violations and emissions, as well as on permit prices. Those who were 
predicted to be net sellers of permits tended to have higher emissions and lower violations than 
those who were predicted to be net buyers of permits. The effect of the initial allocation of 
permits on emissions choices could have significant implications for the cost-effectiveness of 
emissions trading programs. Furthermore, the effect on violations could have significant 
implications for enforcing these programs. We believe that the effects of the initial allocation of 
permits deserve further study, and suggest that future work in this area focus more closely on this 
issue. 
In general it is clear that if emissions trading programs are to fulfill their theoretical 
promise of cost-effective pollution control, they must be enforced well. Designing appropriate 
enforcement strategies requires a comprehensive understanding of compliance behavior in these 
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programs. The theory of compliance and enforcement of emissions trading programs is well 
advanced, but there are virtually no empirical analyses of the results of this literature. Further 
experimental analyses, like that contained in this paper, would help develop a more theoretically 
and empirically balanced understanding of compliance behavior in emissions trading programs.   
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 Table 1.  Comparative statics of an individual firm’s choices   
 Choice 
 Emissions (qi) Permits (l i) Violations (vi) 
π  iqπ  = 0 ilπ  > 0 ivπ  < 0 
φ  iqφ = 0 ilφ  > 0 ivφ  < 0 
p  ipq  < 0 ipl  < 0 ipv > 0 
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 
α i  iqα  > 0 ilα  > 0 ivα  = 0 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Experimental design 
 Aggregate Standard 
 Uniform Allocation Non-uniform Allocation 
Enforcement 
Strategy 
Low 
Standard 
High 
Standard 
High 
Standard 
Med(πH) MEP A D G 
Med(πL) MEP B E H 
Low MEP C F I 
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Table 3. Permit Price Summary Statistics 
  
Enforcement 
Strategy 
Competitive 
Equilibrium Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
A. Med(πH) MEP 9.61 9.30 1.18 9.48 - 9.75 
B. Med(πL) MEP 
8 - 8.20 
13.26 13.50 1.84 13.08 - 13.44 Lo
w
 
St
an
da
rd
 
C. Low MEP 6 8.11 7.90 1.55 7.94 - 8.29 
D. Med(πH) MEP 7.09 7.25 1.02 6.99 - 7.20 
G. Med(πH) MEP 
    non-uniform 7.79 7.60 1.10 7.68 - 7.89 
E. Med(πL) MEP 6.74 6.85 0.58 6.68 - 6.81 
H. Med(πL) MEP 
    non-uniform 
6 - 6.20 
7.24 7.20 1.39 7.11 - 7.37 
F. Low MEP 3.97 4.00 0.74 3.87 - 4.06 H
ig
h 
St
an
da
rd
 
I. Low MEP  
    non-uniform 
4 
6.50 7.00 1.36 6.34 - 6.67 
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Table 4.   Summary Statistics for Individual Violations 
Enforcement  
Strategy 
Competitive 
Equilibrium 
Firm 
Type Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
A 3.05 3.00 0.98 2.88 - 3.22 
A. Med(πH) MEP 
B 1.98 2.00 1.45 1.73 - 2.23 
A 1.86 1.00 1.99 1.51 - 2.20 
B. Med(πL) MEP 
3 
B 1.20 1.00 1.4 0.96 - 1.44 
A 3.66 3.00 1.95 3.32 - 4.00 
L
ow
 
St
an
da
rd
 
C. Low MEP (4 or 5) 
B 3.26 3.00 1.54 2.99 - 3.52 
A 1.17 1.00 1.1 0.98 - 1.36 
D. Med(πH) MEP 
B 0.73 0.00 1.3 0.50 - 0.95 
A 0.63 0.00 1.24 0.42 - 0.84 G. Med(πH) MEP 
    non-uniform B 1.35 1.00 1.2 1.14 - 1.55 
A 1.42 1.00 1.34 1.19 - 1.66 
E. Med(πL) MEP 
B 0.80 0.00 1.46 0.54 - 1.05 
A 0.77 0.00 2.26 0.38 - 1.15 H. Med(πL) MEP 
    non-uniform 
1 
B 1.48 1.00 1.71 1.18 - 1.77 
A 3.61 3.00 2.38 3.20 - 4.02 
F. Low MEP 
B 1.41 1.00 1.31 1.18 - 1.63 
A 1.76 1.00 2 1.41 - 2.10 
H
ig
h 
St
an
da
rd
 
I. Low MEP  
    non-uniform 
(2 or 3) 
B 2.81 2.00 2.04 2.46 - 3.16 
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Table 5.  Summary Statistics for Individual Emissions  
  
Enforcement  
Strategy 
Competitive 
Equilibrium Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
95% Confidence 
Interval 
A. Med(πH) MEP 7.34 7.00 1.19 7.14 - 7.55 
B. Med(πL) MEP 
9 
5.77 5.00 2 5.43 - 6.12 L
ow
 
St
an
da
rd
 
C. Low MEP 11 8.33 8.00 1.69 8.04 - 8.62 
D. Med(πH) MEP 10.37 10.00 1.09 10.18 - 10.56 
G. Med(πH) MEP 
    non-uniform 11.35 10.00 2.54 10.91 - 11.79 
E. Med(πL) MEP 10.59 11.00 1.28 10.37 - 10.81 
H. Med(πL) MEP 
    non-uniform 
11 
11.15 11.00 1.42 10.91 - 11.40 
F. Low MEP 11.84 12.00 1.71 11.55 - 12.14 
Fi
rm
 A
 
H
ig
h 
St
an
da
rd
 
I. Low MEP  
    non-uniform 
13 
13.12 13.00 1.53 12.86 - 13.39 
A. Med(πH) MEP 4.69  5.00 0.96 4.52 - 4.85 
B. Med(πL) MEP 
4 
4.28 4.00 1.29 4.06 - 4.50 L
ow
 
St
an
da
rd
 
C. Low MEP 5 5.58 6.00 0.72 5.46 - 5.71 
D. Med(πH) MEP 5.53 5.00 0.96 5.36 - 5.70 
G. Med(πH) MEP 
    non-uniform 4.63 5.00 0.74 4.50 - 4.76 
E. Med(πL) MEP 5.63 5.00 0.88 5.48 - 5.78 
H. Med(πL) MEP 
    non-uniform 
5 
5.09 5.00 1.18 4.89 - 5.29 
F. Low MEP 7.18 7.00 0.71 7.06 - 7.30 
Fi
rm
 B
 
H
ig
h 
St
an
da
rd
 
I. Low MEP 
     non-uniform 
6 
5.45 5.00 1.19 5.24 - 5.65 
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Table 6.   Random Effects Estimation of Permit Price 
Effect 
 
Estimate Standard Error t-value Pr > | t | 
Intercept 8.2643 0.5609 14.73 <.0001 
MediumMEP 2.5606 0.5321 4.81 <.0001 
NonUniform 1.1059 0.6142  1.80 0.0719 
HighStandard -4.0423 0.6144 -6.58 <.0001 
 
3044 observations, 216 subjects. Wald χ2(3) = 37.55 (p= 0.000) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Random Effects Estimation of Individual Violations 
 
Effect 
 
Estimate Standard Error t-value Pr > | t | 
Intercept 2.454 0.337 7.28 0.000 
PriceHat 0.120 0.043 2.78 0.006 
MediumMEP -1.689 0.220 -7.68 0.000 
NetSeller -0.866 0.190 -4.55 0.000 
FirmTypeA 0.037 0.190 0.2 0.845 
 
2376 observations, 216 subjects. Wald χ2(4) = 72.70 (p= 0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
Table 8.   Random Effects Logit Estimation of the Probability of an Individual Violation 
(1  =  violation) 
Effect 
 
Estimate Standard Error t-value Pr > | t | 
Intercept 3.481 0.520 6.70 0.000 
PriceHat 0.347 0.066 5.22 0.000 
MediumMEP -4.418 0.453 -9.75 0.000 
NetSeller -1.233 0.284 -4.35 0.000 
FirmTypeA -0.615 0.345 -1.78 0.075 
 
2376 observations, 216 subjects. Wald χ2(4) = 138.45 (p= 0.000) 
 
 
Table 9.  Random Effects Estimation of Individual Emissions 
 
Effect 
 
Estimate Standard Error t-value Pr > | t | 
Intercept 8.1757       0.3420 23.90       <0.0001 
PriceHat -0.5053 0.0437 -11.57  <0.0001 
MediumMEP -0.0888 0.2231 -0.40  0.6906 
NetSeller 1.6294       0.1931 8.44  <0.0001 
FirmTypeA 5.1888 0.1931 26.87  <0.0001 
 
2376 observations, 216 subjects. Wald χ2(4) = 360.29 (p= 0.000) 
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Appendix: Instructions Summary10 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s experiment.  You have all seen a version of this 
experiment before.  Before we begin, I would like to review the instructions for today’s 
experiment.   
 It is very important to remember that although the experiment may be similar, some or all 
of the numbers may have changed.  Do NOT assume that any of the information or results from a 
previous experiment will be useful in helping you to make your decisions today. 
 The purpose of the experiment is to give you an opportunity to earn as much money as 
possible. What you earn will depend on your decisions, as well as the decisions of others. As 
before you can produce as many units as you want regardless of the number of permits you own, 
but you could face a financial penalty if you do not own a permit for each unit you produce.   
• During the period, you can earn money in two ways: 
1. Produce units of the fictitious good.  For each unit you produce, you will earn a 
specified amount of money that will be added to your cash balance. 
2. Sell permits in the permit market.  The selling price you receive for a permit will be 
added to your cash balance. 
• Money will be subtracted from your cash balance if: 
1.  You choose to buy additional permits. The purchase price you pay will be deducted 
from your cash balance. 
2. You are audited and if the total number of units you produce exceeds the number of 
permits you own.   
 
Production Highlights  
• Your Earnings from Production table tells you how many units you can produce and 
how much you will earn from each unit you produce.  You might earn a different 
amount of money for each unit produced. 
• Production of each unit takes a specified amount of time  
• You can only produce one unit at a time.  
                                                 
10  This instructions summary was given to students and read aloud by the experimenter before each session.  During 
the trainers, subjects read a more detailed set of online instructions.  The text of the detailed instructions is 
available from the authors upon request. 
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• The Production Timer tells you how much time is left for you to produce more units. 
• In order to start production of a unit, there must be sufficient time on the Production 
Timer to complete production of the unit. 
• To start production or to place an order for additional units, click the plus (+) button. 
If production is idle, then production will begin immediately. 
• You can cancel units that have been ordered if production has not yet begun.  To do 
so, click the minus (–) button. 
• Earnings from the units produced are automatically added to your cash balance when 
production is completed. 
• The last row of the “Earnings from Production” table tells you the maximum number 
of units you are able to produce.   
• Under the “Earnings from Production” table, you can see the production status of 
each unit (produced, in production, or planned). 
 
Permit Market Highlights 
• You will be given an opportunity to buy and/or sell permits in the Permit Market. 
• There are 4 ways in which you can participate in the market: 
1. Make an offer to buy a permit. 
a.  To do so, enter your price next to the My Buying Price and click Buy. 
b. All buying prices must be GREATER than the Current Buying Price. 
2. Make an offer to sell a permit. 
a. To do so, enter your price next to the My Selling Price and click Sell. 
b. All selling prices must be LOWER than the Current Selling Price. 
3. Purchase a permit at the Current Selling Price. 
a. To do so, enter the Current Selling Price next to My Buying Price 
b. or click the Buy button next to the Current Selling Price. 
4. Sell a permit at the Current Buying Price. 
a. To do so, enter the Current Buying Price next to My Selling Price 
b. or click the Sell button next to the Current Buying Price. 
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• After each trade is completed, your permit balance will be automatically updated.  Your 
cash balance will automatically be updated to reflect price you paid to buy the permit, or 
the price you received for selling the permit.  This is shown in the My Balances section of 
your screen. 
 
Auditing Highlights 
• The computer monitor always knows how many permits you own and your cash balance.  
The computer does not know how many units you actually produced unless you are 
audited. 
• There is an XX% chance that you will be audited, and (1-XX)% chance you will not be 
audited.   
• If you are audited, the computer monitor will check to see how many units you actually 
produced.  If the number of units you produced exceeds the number of permits you own, 
you will receive a financial penalty.  The Permit Shortfall Table lists the penalties you 
will face.  
 
To summarize, your total earnings for the period will be calculated as follows: 
 Your initial cash balance 
+  Earnings from production of the good 
+  Selling price for permits you sell in the permit market 
–  Purchase price for permits you buy in the permit market 
–  Penalties for a permit shortfall (only if you are audited and if you over produced) 
=  Total earnings for the period 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will add up your total earnings for each period and you will be 
paid in cash for these earnings.  Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
